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You have asked for comments appropriate to the puhlic hearing to be held
by the Environmental Protection Agency concerning ,its proposed regulations
perti nent to the modifi cati on of the secondary treatment requi I'ement.
Strictly speaking, the requirement which in certain cases is now subject
to modification is that the pollutant concentrations in effluents be subject
to lin'litations based on the level of effluei1t quality achievable by secondary
treatment. This requirement was imposed on the disch~r~es of publicly-o~/ned
\\'astel'/ater tl'eatment works by the federal Clean Water f,ct as it \,;as al~ended in
1972. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has defined the effect~ of
secondary treatment in terms of standar:ds as to concentrations of biochemical
demand (800) and suspended solids and the negative log of the hydrogen ion
concentration (pH): However the Clean ~Jater Act \'1a5 further amended in i977
to provide that under certain conditions, ar.long them discharge to Eitlrine \'fc1ters,
the Administrator of the Environmental Protection /I.gency Il1ay issue a Nat"ional
Pollution Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit ~hich modifies the
effluent limitations based on these secondary-trea-tment standards. It is the
regulations proposed by EPA in respon~e to this recent amendment that are the
subject of the hearing in question.
It is not a primary intent of the hearing to determine the appropriateness
of issuillg a NPDES permit with modified secondary treatment requirement for
any particular discharge. Nevertheless it was the recognition of the
inappropriateness of these requirements for certain discharges that led to the
~:'lendl11ent of the Clean Water Act. Hence, as examples, the conditions that
\':arrant exemption of some of these discharge from the secondary treatment
requirement are certain to be discussed at the hearin~. I believe that
repr selltatives of the State of Ha\'/ai i wi 11 ~)resent testirlony on conditions
','l1rranting exemrtions in the case of the di chilr~~e cf sp.\'/age effluent frol~l th"
1:~unicipa1 Sand Island facility on Oahu, for ~xl1Flr>l(~, anct possibly other
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'municipal discharges as well. I have, in the past several years, contributed
to the technical arguements for exempting the Sand Island discharge froln the
secondary-treatment requ.irement. I am not a,,,are of si~nificantt valid,
counter-arguements, but I expect that the· other representatives can supply
more up to date information than I can.
It is also not a primary intent of the hearing to argue the philosophy
underlyi ng the Cl ean vJater Act and its recent amendment. I wi sh to di scuss
this philosophy, however, because the appropriateness of the regulations
• adopted by the EPA and the wi sdom with ,,,hi ch they are implemented will depenc:
upon how EPA views the purposes of the Clean Water ~ct and the amendment.
Fundamental purposes and inconsistent goal statements
I consider that the basic purpose of government should be to induce human
bein9s to control their activities in such a way as to optimize the welfare of
the human race in general and over the long term. A narrower purpose may be
appropriate for the u.S. Government, but I know of no one who would argue
for a more restricted purpose than to optimize the welfare of Americans for
the next generation or two.
The objectives of all legislation should be .consistent with these
purpose.s. Recogni z-i n9, hm"ever, that it is beyond human capl1bil i ti es to
determine what will be optimal in all cases, and that expenditures of undue
effort to determine what will be optimal in trivial cases would in themselves
be non-optimal, it is aprropl~iate tha.t there be some generalization in
legislation--some imposition of uniform requirements that represent what will
be optimal in the general case although there will be some insignificant
exceptions. The original secondary-treatment requir~ment in the Clean Water
Act seems clearly to represent an example of the imposition of a uniform
requirement. The allovJance for exer.lptions from the requirement in the
amendment of the Act represents recognition that some of the exceptions are
significant.
The legislative history of· the Clean Hater Act Amendment of 1972, and its
language, indicate that the Congress was reluctant to delegate to administerin~
agencies significant authority to determine what"level of pollution control
will be optimal in individual cases. The reluctance stemmed from frustration
with the overwei~hting of benefits that were purely short-term, purely econo~ic,
or would accrue primarily to special interest groups, in the disposition of
cases by these agencies and the courts. In the Act there are, as a result,
levels of specificity and uniformity that are demonstrably inconsistent with
the fundamental objectives.
. Even the goals stated in the Act are inconsistant with these objectives.
It is declared, for example, that "it is the national ~oal that the discharge
of pollutants into navigable \'/aters be eliminated by 1985." E;ven if it is
considered that the term "pollutilnts" refers to those of human origin alone,
this goal could be considered consistent with the fundamental objectives only
if it could be assumed that:
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'a) the net effect of every polluting discharge to the water were
detrimental;
b) to every polluting discharge to the waters there were a superior
alternative; or
c) if there were exceptions to a) and b) they would be so inconsequential
that either (i) it would not be worth the effort, or (ii) we are
socially incapable of lT1akin~ the effort, to identify and allow for
the exceptions while retaining the prohibition against polluting
discharges where it is appropriate.
It will be recognized that there would still be a release of pollutants
to marine \'/aters if discharges from municipal sewage systems are permitted aftEr
secondary treatment, but it \"i11 be instructive to examine the extent to which
the imposition of the secondary-treatment ~equirement would be appropriate, in
terms of the listed assumptions, in the case of a discharge to marine waters
such as that at, Sand Island.
~~licabili~of assumptions to Sand Island case
There are cl early some detrill1enta 1 effects of sevJage di scharges. Those
longest recognized as warranting treatment before discharge are the public
health hazards. With the past discharge at Sand Island of raw sewage, not far
offshore and in shallow water, there was clearly a health hazard, althouqll it
i·taS not a major one, and there were no demonstrable health detriments. I
expect that other testimony will indicate .that: a) with the present dischar9~
offshore and in deep water, there is no signi.ficant health hazard; b) with
advanced primary treatment, bacterial and viral die-offs will be even further
increased; and c) secondary treatment cannot be effective in further reductioi:
of health hazards.
Before the longer, deeper outfall was put to use at Sand Island there was
an esthetic detriment associated \'Jith the disct\arCle, but that seems now to
be wholly eli~inated.
A detriment associated \"ith the discharge of sewage that is a principal
reason in general for prescribing secondary treatment is roo. However, the
mlxlng conditions are so good and the aeration of the ocean waters is so grea~
at Sand Island that the depression of oxygen concentrations was not measurable
even with the discharge of raw sewage in shallower water. It would be even
less with the discharge further offshore in deeper water.
Offsetting these new negligible detriments there has ah/ays been, and tll~re
remai ns one defi ni te benefi t. Tlli sis the increased productivity of the ma ri n"l
waters due to dispersal in them of the nutrients in the effluent. Nutrients
in excess are properly regarded as pOllutants, but the essentiality of nutrien~s
to life ought not to be overlooked. The benefits of nlltl~ient disposal on land
and even in aqu culture are recognized in the Clean Water Act. I expect that
other tcstilllOlly will dClilons tratc thllt, in contri"lst to I1lilny restricted wiltcrs)
t.he waters of the open oceiJn ilre nutl'ient deficient, and the effects of incre..ls2~
nutrient concentriltions should be considered belleficial, not detrimental. Hi1:~;
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secondary treatment of the Sand Island effluent there would be some decreases
in nutrient discharges, and the, nutrients would be discharged more in inorganic
form requiring incorporation at lower levels in the food chain than nutrients
in organic form discharge after primary treatment alone.
The net environmental impact of the discharge at Sand Island is, therefor~,
beneficial, but the benefits would be reduced if secondary treatment were
introduced.
The alternative to discharge of the Sand Island effluent after the advanc~0
primary treatment that is planned by the ,State is discharge after secondary
treatment such as \voul d be requi red by the Cl ean \·Iater Act before the 1977
amendment. Even if the net impact of the di scharge wi thout secondary treatment
were neutral instead of beneficial it would be impossible to consider discharpc
with secondary treatment superior because there are clearly costs not offset
!)y benefits associated v/ith the secondary 'treatment itself. The costs are
not only economic but environmental. The disposal of the sludge would present
some problems. Much more seriously, there would be an expenditure of energy
~·!hich, in the l1ght of the \'lOrld energy resource situ'ation would be most
extravagant.
To a federal agency like the EPA, a discharge such as that at Sand Islan~
r.1ay. perhaps seem inconsequent i a1 and not \'!orth exempt i n~ from the seconda ry
treatment requirement. However, the Sand Island discharge is the largest
discharge of sewage effluent in Haw~ii. The construction of the present
outfall and of the primary-treatment \\'orks are major capital improvements in
the State, and a secondary-treatment facility would represent another I.lajor
capital improvement. Rationally, the ide~tification of and allowance for an
appropriate exception to any regulation is \'iorthwhile if the effort at
identification is small in comparison with the benefits to be achieved by the
exception. The benefits of the exception to the secon<1i\ry-treatment require-
r~ent as applied to the Sand Island discharge are great. The effort to prove
the merits of the exception has already been made. Jilthough achievement of its
~~jective has been frustrated for many years by the changing legal situation.
the effort has been relatively small relative t.o the benefits of the exemptio:-:'
from the secondary treatment rcqui rement.
In summary, there is no net detriment, but on the. contrary a net benefi t,
to the discharge of primary-treated effluent at Sand Island. Secondary
treatment, rather than being superior, would be detrimental, environmentally
as \'/ell as economically. It is, not mere y \'Jol"th the effort to exempt tte
Sand Island discharge from the secondary-treatment requirement, the effort ha~
~lready been made. The sole rational basis for refus 1 to grant the exemptir~
\"nuld be societal inability to identify and allow for such exemptions where
appropriate \vhile retaining the requ'il'eillent fOI~ secondary treatment else\'/herp..
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The societal ability question,
Reference has already been made to the' reluctance of Congress in 1972 to
delegate significant decisior -making authority to agencies administering the
Clean vJater Act. The legisl; -:ive history and language of the 1977 amendment to
the Act indicate that Congress has remained skeptical of the ability of agencies
to allow for exceptions to the secondary treatment requirement \vhile retaining
the requirement where it is appropriate. The amendment has been characterized
-as providing "a 1illlited exception" and a "narrol.oJ opportuni ty." In stressing
these characterizations EPA seems to share the skepticism of the Congress even
though it is to EPA itself that the decision-making power has been delegated.
The apparent lack of self-confidence in EPA is likely to be the principal
bar to the wise implenentation of the provision of the amendment. It is not
reassuring that, although it has recognized the environmental arguements that
have been presented for the exception to the secondary-treatment requirement,
EPA has stated in its proposal of the implementing regulations that the
provision for the exception v.Jas "designed to reduce pollution control costs"
for publ icly oVllied treatment v/orks. The EPA seems to' overlook still the fact
that, under the circumstances pertaining to discharges such as that at Sand
Island t it is not so much the increased economic costs of the secondary
treat~ent as the environmental detriments associated with the requirement that
have promoted attempts to have the requirement modified and justify that
modification.
I would like to believe that the comments in this letter may contribute to
providing a rationale for interpretihg the Clean Water Act as a~ended whenever
interpretation is possible, and to persuading EPA to use this rationale with
confidence.
Specific issues
The EPA has especially invited comment at the public hearing on three
questions as to the interpretation of the recent amendment that may be
abbreviated as follows: •
(1) Should minor discharges be allowed, in their applications for
modified NPDES permits t to supply less extensive information than is
required in the case of major dischargers or dischargers of effluents
that contain toxic substances?
(2) Does the law permit EPA to develop special regulations for small
villages in the Trust TerritorYt etc.?
(3) Does the lavi permit EPA to issue a modified NPDES permit for a
discharue that does not now exist in the form to be permitted?
RationallYt the ans\'/er to all three questions should be in the affirmative.
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EPA has raised the first question because of the language of the Act that
provides that a modified NPO,ES permit may be issued only if the applicant
demonstrates to the satisfaction of the Administrator that certain conditions
are met. The Administ~ator should be satisfied with a less comprehensive
demonstration, the ambient conditions being equal, if the discharge to which
the application relates is small and contains no toxic substances than othen·lise.
EPA has raised the last two questions because of the language of the
amended Act that restricts the issuance of a modified NPOES permit lito the
. discharge of a pollutant in an existing discharge from a [publicly owned .
treatment works] into marine \1laters. 1I If a pollutant is being discharged lnto
marine waters, directly or indirectly, whether or not by way of the publicly-
O\·med treatment facility, the amendment should be considered at least to allow,
if not to encourage, the issuance of a modified NPOES permit for the discharge
. providing the extent of treatment will be optimal and the discharge will be
through an optimally located outfall.
It would be absurd to require a small Trust Territory village whose sewa~e
reaches the marine waters directly by way of shoreline privies or indirectly
by way of inland privies to provide non-beneficial secondarj' treatment if and
when it provides a public collection system and an ocean outfall.
So far as Hawaiian cases are concerned, my comments heretofore have
related solely to the discharge from the Sand Island outfall which now exists
and which will be subject to advanced primary treatment in a facility now under
construction. The same net benefits of modification of the secondary-treatment
requirement will apply in the case of the Honouliuli outfall, unless
and unti 1 the bul k of the effl uent from the treatment faci 1i ty can be used on
land for irrigation. The depth and offshore distance of the outfall and the
mixing conditions will be essentially the same as tho~e at Sand Island. The
di~charges that will occur through the new outfall are now made to marine
\1laters by vlay of Pearl Harbor, where they are objectionable. It \'Iould be absurd
to require an environmentally detrimental secondary level of treatment of these
discharges when they can be disposed of through the new outfall simply because
they are not now disposed of through this outfall.
Similar cases may perhaps be made in the case of marine discharges of
other municipal sewerage systems in Hawaii, including some through outfalls·
not yet in operation, but I am not sufficiently infonned concerning these
other cases to make judgements about them.
Yours very truly.
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